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ABSTRACT
Amongst the manpower problems facing South Africa at the 
end of the 1970's, are the prevalence of poverty amongst 
a large proportion of the population, a shortage of 
skilled labour combined with a surplus of unskilled 
labour, and a need to establish equal opportunities for 
all members of the labour force in all sectors of the 
economy.
These same three problems (with some differences in 
emphasis) were also recognised in the United States of 
America in the period following the Second World War. 
Various groups, from social reform organisations to the 
Federal Government, initiated concerted and large-scale 
projects in an attempt to solvt* the problems. Voluntary 
efforts were made by both the public and private sectors, 
while legal measures were introduced to provide the 
necessary and relevant backing. Some twenty years later 
poverty, under-utilisatior of manpower and unequal 
employment opportunities, are no longer probleus of such 
magnitude.
Because the US has not only experienced the same problems 
as South Africa, but has also found solutions to them, it 
was logical to study the US situation and to compare it 
with the South African one.
This research rBport concentrates on the use and 
effectiveness of minimum wage legislation in combating 
poverty; of training schemes in alleviating both aspects 
of the skill problem; and of personnel practices in 
creating an environment in which equal opportunities is 
a meaningful concept for all workers.
It was found that US minimum wage legislation does not, 
by itself, cause general unemployment, because not all 
sectors of the economy are subject to the laws. However 
certain groups of workers have experienced higher rates 
of unemployment, ana the relatively high minimum wage 
appears to have been a contributory factor.
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The problem in South Africa is not only how to reduce 
large-scale v employment, but also how to reduce poverty. 
There is, that', a need to specify a wages 'floor* which 
will allow workers to earn at least a subsistence income, 
but, at the same time, this ’floor’ must not discourage 
the creation of new employment opportunities. The 
writer's proposed solution to this dichotomy is that a 
low minimum wage should be legally enforceable in almost 
all sectors of the economy.
The need to effectively utilise all the manpower of the 
US, and especially to reduce the number of people totally 
dependant on welfare benefits, led to the introduction of 
a large number of public and private training schemes 
covering a wide variety of subjects, and catering for 
many differentiated target groups within the total labour 
force.
By contrast, the South African labour problem appears to 
be relatively sizzle, i.e. to train the surplus supply 
of unskilled workers in . uffieient numbers to remove the 
shortages of skillua labour. Unfortunately, the large 
numerical size of the problem makes it a very complex 
task, not least because South Africa is not in a position 
to devote the necessary large-scale financial resources 
to numerous and varied training projects. As a result, 
it has only been possible to propose that State-run 
institutions concentrate on offering a wider range of 
courses than tney do at present, and to rely on the 
private sector to continue to provide Job-specific 
training at all levels, and to increase their investment 
in this field as resources permit.
With respect to personnel policies within individual firms, 
the emphasis in both the US and South Africa has been, and 
still is, on removing all instances of racial discrim­
ination. The US has made overt discrimination impossible 
by enacting appropriate laws, while remaining instances 
of covert discrimination are fought by civil rights action 
groups. Jn South Africa, certain laws relating to labour 
legislation are currently being investigated by two
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Commissions of Enquiry, and it is anticipated that they 
will recommend the introduction of legal powers prohibiting 
racial discrimination. Meanwhile, many private sector 
employers have already adopted non-racial employment 
practices in the recruitment and promotion, areas, and they 
have indicated that it is their firm intention to continue 
with such po"1 icies until all I'acial barriers nave been 
removed from the work situation.
The similarity between the labour situation in the US in 
the early 1960's and South Africa in the late 1970's, has 
proved invaluable. It has been possible to draw on US 
experience in dealing with the three aspects with which 
this report is concerned, discarding some Ideas and actions 
as impracticable, while adopting or adapting those which 
have proved successful and also suit South African 
conditions.
One final point must be noted with respect to terminology. 
It has become common practice not to use the name 'Bantu' 
at all, but rather to refer to this section of the South 
African population as 'Blacks'. It must be understood 
that 'Blacks' do not include Coloureds and Asians.
Moreover, in recent months, the South African government 
has also stated that the word 'Bantu' should be replaced 
by the word 'Blacks'. Hence, except where quotations are 
used, or official documents referred to, the writer has 
also used the name 'Blacks' to indicate that part of the 
population which is not White, Coloured or Asian.
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CHAPTER 1. WAGE LEGISLATION
1.1 Wage and Employment Determination in aCompetitive Market
According to classical theory, wage rates and the level 
of employment are determined by the forces of supply and 
demand. A firm’s demand curve for labour will be 
affected, inter alia, by the demand for its product(s), 
by its technical and managerial ability, by its capital- 
labour ratio, and the relative costs of factors. In 
the context of labour demand, the marginal revenue product 
of labour (MRP^) is weighed against costs, or wage (WL).
In equilibrium, MRP^ equals W^.
Figure 1 represents an equilibrium situation, where at 
wage rate W^, the number employed will be ON.
Figure 1 The Determination of Wages and Employment under Perfectly Competitive Conditions
Assuming that the wage rate rises from WQ to Wm, whilst 
other things remain unchanged, the firm will reduce the 
numbers employed to OM. For the firm, the total labour 
costs will change according to the elasticities of the 
two curves. If the rise in the wage rate, from WQ to 
Wm, is proportionately more than the reduction in employ-
2.
ment, total labour costs will increase, and the firm 
will consider whether it can absorb the extra cost or 
whether it can alter its production process in such 
a way as to produce the same output with less labour, 
and thus maintain the total labour cost at, or near, 
the original equilibrium level.
From labour's point of view, the increase in the wage 
rate to Wm, is beneficial for the workers still em­
ployed. However, not only are there now some workers 
directly unemployed (MN), but the higher wage has also 
called forth a considerably greater number of potential 
workers (NP), effectively creating a pool of onemployed.
The more inelastic the demand curve ior labour, the less
is the effect on employment resulting from a rise in
wage rates (01im)« On the other hand, with a very elastic
supply curve, a rise in wage rates has a large adverse
effect on employment, i.e. the total supply of labour
increases by NP J m
The effect on labour's income varies with the elasticities 
of the two curves, and can be measured by the difference 
between the change in wages relative to the change in 
employment (rectangles marked A and B in Figure 1), i.e. 
the difference between OM x OW^ and ON x 0WQ. However, 
as pointed out above, the additional income is only 
shared by a few workers, namely, those remaining in 
employment (OM).
1.2 Genera] Ki’f^cts oi an Externally Determined Wage
In a competitive market, the equilibrium position is where 
ON workers are employed at a wage at rate of OW^, and ail 
resources are allocated in the most efficient way. Any 
deviation from this point causes an inefficient allocation 
of resources.
Such a deviation can be caused when governmental policy 
decrees that there should be a minimum wage for all 
workers, and sets that minimum rate above the equilibrium 
level, i„e. at OW^. As explained above, where there is
3.
no change in the demand and supply curves, the high 
legislated minimum wage causes MN workers to be directly 
unemployed, and also encourages an additional number of 
workers (NP) to enter the labour market. The increase 
in the labour supply is based on either, or both, of 
two assumptions. Firstly, persons who did not seek 
work at the equilibrium wage are now looking for work, 
for example, housewives or inhabitants of rural areas. 
Secondly, persons who were previously employed for a 
normal working week are now prepared to work overtime.
The overall employment effect, then, is to reduce the 
numbers employed to OM, and to cause MP workers to be 
unemployed.
The total income effect of an above-equilibrium level 
minimum wage cannot be calculated unless the coefficients 
f the labour supply and demand curves are known. How- 
ver, from the point of view of individual workers, the 
income effect is easily measured. The MN workers who 
are now unemployed lose all their previous wage income, 
while the NP new entrants to the labour market cannot 
earn any wage income at all. Only the OM workers who 
remain in employment will gain, because they share all 
the higher income amongjt themselves.
1.3 Minimum Wage Legislation
The actual effects of setting minimum wage rates at a 
level above the free market rates, are considerably 
more complex than a theoretical explanation would 
indicate. Tne reduction in employment, and the re­
distribution of wage incomes amongst a smaller number 
of workers, is not necessarily the only, and is certainly 
not the final, result.
1.3.1 Some Examples cf Legislated Minimum Wa.^ es
Many countries operate minimum wage laws, but these differ 
in form and effect, and are not peculiar to either a 
particular type of political system, or to a particular 
stage in economic development.
The United Kingdom does not have such laws, although 
unemployment benefit rates and other social welfare 
measures provide an effective wage floor, below which 
wage rates do not fall. This is so simply because 
people will not work for less. Hence, machinery exists 
which effectively provides minimum wage rates. There 
is no explicit 'law1, but since the outcome is the same, 
the system can be described as equivalent to minimum 
v/age legislation. In Australia, on the other hand, 
there is a single national minimum wage applicable to all 
workers, which is strictly enforced and frequently up­
dated to allow for changes in the cost of living. France 
has a guaranteed minimum 'subsistence wage' which provides 
a pivot for the whole wage structure of the nation.
Many developing countries have also ado* -aininrum wage 
legislation. Kenya and Uganda, for example, have legal 
minimum wage rates, the levels of which vary from one 
urban centre to another.1' Tanzania has a similar
system, with the addition of minimum rates for workers2)in rural areas. J Zambia provides statutory minimum 
wages only where employee and employer organisations are 
ineffective.^
These few examples indicate the widespread adoption of the 
concept of a minimum wage for workers. They also show 
the variety of forms such laws take, from the single rate 
covering the whole labour force in Australia, through the 
several rates applicable to only certain groups of workers 
in Zambia, to the reliance on welfare benefits acting as 
a lower limit on all wage rates in the United Kingdom.
1) R D Scott, The Determination of Statutory Minimum Wages in East Africa: A Case Study in the Politics of Resource Allocation, Canadian Journal of African Studies. Vol. 1, No. ? T ( ~ “T97Ly Loyola' College, Montreal; pp.lA6-l48 passim.
2) Ibid; p.148
3) J E Knight, Wages and Zambia's Economic Development, in Charles Elliott (Ed), Constraints on the Economic Development oi Zambia. O.U.P., Nairobi, l'971s pp.53-99.
The difference in the extent of minimum wage legislation 
between countries, is partly a result of the economic, 
social and political forces which brought such 
legislation into being in the first place, and partly a 
result of the effects of the original legislation on 
those same economic, social and political forces, In 
other words, there is not always a clear line of cause 
and effect.
1.3.2 Social Forces Influencing Minimum Wage Legislation___________________________
During the period when Western European countries were 
industrialising, social reformers were the leading 
forces behind the movement to raise wages above the then 
prevailing subsistence levels. Briefly, their argument, 
as expounded by J B Clark, one of their most influential 
spokesmen, was that it was morally unjustifiable that 
workers should not receive a share of total revenue 
which was equal to the value they added to the final 
product. In effect, they were saying that wages should 
equal the value of labour's marginal product, and that 
the owners of capital should not appropriate more than 
their share, at the expense of labour. Clark expressed 
this in terms of neo-classical economic theory.^
The social reformers also argued that it was morally 
wrong for any part of the population to suffer poverty, 
ill-health and malnutrition unnecessarily, and low wages 
had exactly these ill effects. In economic terms this 
argument translates as low paid workers are less 
productive than better paid (and therefore healthier) 
ones. Subsequently, social reformers succeeded in 
preventing children under certain age from being 
employed at all, and in limiting the hours of work of 
young people and women. Again, their arguments were 
based on moral grounds, but the economic effect was to 
reduce the supply of labour which, with no factor
4) John Bates Clark, The Distribution of Wealth. MacMillan and Co. Ltd, London, 192?; pp.l-lO
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substitution or technical changes, automatically led to 
a higher wage for the fewer number of available workers. 
Moreover, the supply of unskilled, low paid labour was 
also reduced by prohibiting women and young people from 
doing certain dirty, dangerous and/or strenuous Jobs.
A further social factor v/as the belief that all children 
should be educated, again, because it was their right.
The result was a tetter educated labour force, capable 
of doing better quality work and, therefore, worth 
higher wages because their output was greater and/or of 
better quality.
Emphasis on the health, education and general well-being 
of the family as a whole, led to the belief that wages 
paid to an adult male worker should be sufficient to 
maintain his well-being and that of his wife and children.
Although the early social reformers were mainly interested 
in workers being paid a ’decent1 wage, the same arguments 
are still being used today to support claims for legally 
enforced minimum wages. The charge from social pressure 
to legal force is, however, also explained by two other 
forces, i.e. political ar.i economic interest groups.
1.3.3 Political Forces Influencing Minimum Wage Legislation
The three main parties comprising the political forces 
are governments, employers and trade unions.
1.3.3.1 Governments
Governments represent the interests of the people who 
vote them into power, and maintain them in power. 
Eighteenth century Western European governments usually 
represented only the wealthy, land-owning classes. Not 
unnaturally then, their interest in industrial problems 
was limited to the realisation that the growth of factory 
work provided their agricultural labourers with an 
alterative means of earning a living, and was, therefore, 
a threi’f their labour supply. Nevertheless, urban 
areas j ca grew up around factories attracted people
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away from the land. Thus, governments had a vested 
interest in keeping industrial wages low and urban 
conditions unpleasant. By doing little to assist urban 
industrial workers, they hopsd to maintain a large supply 
of farm labour willing to work for low wages.
In time, two factors changed this attitude. Firstly, 
farming became more capital-intensive. Hence, the 
demand for labour in this sector was reduced, and the 
higher output per worker allowed wages to rise in the 
agricultural sector. Secondly, electoral reforms 
brought a wider range of interest groups into government. 
Representatives of industry and labour began to push 
their own interests, and gradually governments became 
involved in the problems of all sections of the 
population.
1.3.3.2 Employers
As industrialists entered the government, they forced an 
increasingly powerful pressure group for their own 
interests. The pace of industrialisation v/as increasing, 
and with the increased supply of labour from the 
agricultural sector, the demand for labour in the modern 
sector continued to rise rapidly. Some industrialists 
adopted some of the attitudes of the social reformers, 
such as the promotion of a better educated, better housed 
and healthier work force. This resulted in a stable and 
more productive labouring class. Many employers could 
afford to pay higher wages, and with demand increasing at 
a faster rate than supply, competition between firms 
pushed up the market-determined rates. Until the 
beginning of the 1960's, the result was not only an 
increase in wage rates, but also an increase in total 
employment.
It cannot be said, however, that employers generally 
support legally enforced minimum wage rates. Legal 
minima interfere with the free interplay of demand and 
supply forces. In a competitive economy, wages will 
tend to equal the value of labour’s marginal product*
An externally imposed change in the price of labour 
upsets this position and causes, at least in the short 
run, a period of disequilibrium. Moreover, employers 
are no longer free to reduce wages during cyclical 
downswings. Instead, market conditions force them to 
reduce the numbers employed and/or to change the 
relationships amongst all factor inputs. While some 
firms may be able to absorb the higher labour costs, 
others will not, and nay even be forced out of business. 
Less competition between films in the same industry may, 
as a result, put some firms into a monopclistic position, 
which leads to a sub-optimal allocation of resources.
1.3.3.3 Trade Unions
The third force involved in minimum wage determination 
is organised groups of workers, i.e. unions.^ Their 
political power has grown rapidly since the beginning of 
the twentieth century. In countries where labour is 
scarce, their influence on the whole economy is usually 
great. But even where there is a large surplus of 
labour, organised workers, especially in urban areas, 
are a strong political force. This has been evident in 
the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia, where 
often it is their support which keeps governments in 
power. In many cases, urban workers were a strong 
political force who helped to bring about independence.
In such countries, governments cannot afford to lor-e the 
workers' votes and are, therefore, willing to support 
their demands for higher wages.
In most countries today, governments represent both 
workers and employers, but since there are more workers
5) John T Dunlop. Wage Determination under Trade Unions. The MacMillan Co., l.'ow Yorl;, 1 ® ; ------------------
6) J B Knight, Op.Cit; pp.99-101 passim; R D Scott,Op Clt; p.150; andS Watanabe, Minimum Wages in Developing Countries: myth and reality, International Labour Review. Vol.113, No. 3, May-June 1-^ 76; p.346
9than employers, the former's voting power is greater.
In tri-partite discussions on wages, government rep­
resentatives may be in a mediating position. This is 
often the case in African countries, and the government 
party may need to consider the voting power of each of 
the other two parties, as well as the possible consequent 
urban social unrest if wages are set low. In such 
instances, governments have tended to support wage 
levels nearer the workers' claims, rather than nearer 
the levels which employers are prepared to offer. How­
ever, there are indications that this attitude is 
changing. Many African countries are experiencing 
serious economic difficulties and, to some extent, 
these have been exacerbated by the post-independence 
tendency to grant high minimum wages, which created a 
small, relatively wealthy, urban class, in sharp contrast 
to the majority of poor, rural workers. Moreover, high 
urban industrial wages tended to discourage investments 
from the developed countries of the world. The need to 
maintain the inflow of foreign capital, and to re­
distribute the nation's wealth more equitably, has led 
these countries to question the long term effects on 
the national economy of legislated high minimum wages.
In general, unions are strong supporters of setting high 
legal minimum wages, but their reasons are mostly selfish. 
Well organised labov.r* is usually found in industries 
which are, themselves, well organised, i.e. they are well 
established, use modern production methods, have strong 
internal markets and, probably, good existing or 
potential export markets. For example, in South Africa, 
there are strong trade unions in the metal and printing 
industr es and in foundries. Such industries tend to 
pay above-average wages, regardless of the existence 
or non-existence of legis?ated rates, largely because 
their employees command specific skills. Examples of 
such industri in other parts of Africa are the Zambian 
copper mining companies. These firms have not only 
transplanted Western methods of production, but also
Western attitudes towards collective bargaining with ^ 7) unions. '
In spite of claim'3 to represent workers in general, 
trade unions, in fact, usually represent their own 
members’ interests first, and non-members1 interests 
only incidentally, if at all.' '
During tri-partite discussions on minimum wages, it is 
usually representatives of the strongest and largest 
unions who plead the case for raising the rates. One 
of the reasons for wantxng a higher minimum is so that 
they can use it later to bargain with employers' 
associations in their own industries to raise their own 
skilled members’ wages further, in order to maintain the 
differentials between their rates and the legal minimum 
rates.^ If they operate in industries which can afford 
an increase, without cutting back on employment, their 
members gain. But unskilled workers in lees well 
organised, or unorganised, industries are likely to be 
made unemployed as a result of the higher minimum wage 
rates. Alternatively, unions attempt to shift the 
burden of maintaining full employment onto the State, by 
calling for appropriate economic growth-stimulating 
policies. As Friedman points out, trade unions favour 
higher minimum wage rates because workers who already 
receive well above the minimum, benefit from reduced 
competition from unskilled workers.‘tJ As a result, 
unionised workers often gain at the expense of the non­
unionised sector. 11
7) J B Knight, Wages in Africa: What should a Foreign Firm do?. Oxford Bulletin of frnonomics and Statistics.vol.37, n o ^ t t rr.--------------------
8) D Bell, The Minimum Wase Reconsidered. The Rand CorporatTon7^’an:Ea-^onica7~i^aTI7roraTa, August 1974; pp.2-3.
9) H G Ringrose, The Law and Practice of Employment. Juta& Co. Ltd, Capetown, l970; p.9 (refers to Australia).
10) Milton Friedman, Minimum Wage Rates, in Paul Samuelson, Reading in Economics Sixth Edition, 1970, McGraw Hill Book Co., New York; p.247.
11) D Bell; Op. Clt; p.3
On the other hand, where a few large industries are 
regarded as wage leaders, union activity resulting in 
higher wages within their own industries, has had the 
effect of ’pulling up’ wages in other industries. In 
the 1960*3, the Zambian copper mining unions succeeded 
in obtaining large wage increases, which were followed 
by all other industries in the modern sector, and also by 
the government, who not only raised its own public 
employees' wages, but also raised the legal minimum wage 
f ir unskilled workers by about 33 per cent."1^  During 
the same period, unions in East Africa also succeeded in 
raising the wages of most urban male workers, including 
the unskill ’ ‘ ' by organising strikes and general
In the industrialised countries of Western Europe, where 
unions are not only numerically strong, but also 
politically and economically powerful, some governments 
have found it necessary to maintain continual contacts 
with them, as well as businessmen, in order to ensure 
their policies are in line with union and business 
strategies. A prime example is the United Kingdom's 
National Economic Development Office, where 
representatives of government, industry and unions meet 
regularly to discuss not only economic ends and means, 
but also all other matters affecting the nation as a 
whole.
1.3.4 Economic Forces influencing Minimum Wage
It is difficult to separate the purely economic forces, 
resulting in minimum wage legislation, from the social 
and political factors. This is largely because the 
economic forces in favour of such legislation are 
represented by unions and some political groups, while 
the arguments against are put forward by employers and 
different pressure groups.
12) J B Knight, Wages and Zambia's Economic Development, Op.Git; pp.100-102
13) S Watanabe; Op.Cit; p.347
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